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Abstract
We develop a theory and an empirical strategy to estimate the welfare gains of eco-
nomic integration in economies with frictional local labor markets. The model yields
a welfare formula that nests previous results in the literature and features an addi-
tional adjustment margin, via the employment rate, that generates new insights. We
show that the quantitative impact of this new channel depends on the goods mar-
ket structure and on the degree of firm heterogeneity. To obtain causal estimates of
the two key structural parameters needed for the welfare analysis, the trade elasticity
and the elasticity of substitution in consumption, we propose a theoretically-consistent
identification strategy that exploits exogenous variation in production costs driven by
differences in industrial composition across local labor markets. As an application, we
exploit Germany’s rapid trade integration with China and Eastern Europe between
1988 and 2008 to assess the quantitative importance of accounting for unemployment
changes when computing the gains from trade across local labor markets in West Ger-
many. Under monopolistic competition with free entry and firm heterogeneity, the
median welfare gains in the frictional setting are 6% larger relative to the frictionless
setting. The relative welfare gains are typically more modest under alternative market
structures.
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ment, wages, search and bargaining. JEL Codes: F12, F16, J31, J60.
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1 Introduction
The looming global trade war has reinvigorated the public debate on the merits of inter-
national economic integration. The media focus and the political discourse revolve largely
around the impact of international trade on labor market outcomes, particularly on jobs
and wages. Interest in this topic among economists has not lagged behind. For example,
recent empirical research examines the effects of import penetration and export expansion
on unemployment and wages in US local labor markets (Autor et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al.
(2016) Pierce & Schott (2016), and Feenstra et al. (2017)). Concurrently, the literature has
increasingly acknowledged the prominent empirical role that individual firms play in shaping
the impact of trade shocks on the labor market (Card et al. (2013), Helpman et al. (2017)
and Song et al. (2018)).
What do these findings imply for the outcome of ultimate interest, social welfare? Perhaps
surprisingly, we know relatively little about the quantitative impact of trade-induced changes
in unemployment on welfare and the role that firms play. Our objective in this paper is to
develop a theory and an empirical strategy to estimate the welfare gains from trade in
economies with frictional local labor markets.
The theory introduces search frictions and wage bargaining into a general equilibrium
model with two open economies – one of them composed of many local labor markets – and
multiple industries populated by potentially heterogeneous firms. Our first contribution is
to derive a simple formula that enables a comparison of the gains from trade across models
with alternative market structures (perfect and monopolistic competition) featuring either
frictional or frictionless labor markets. Our welfare formula nests well-known results in the
literature and establishes new insights.
For a class of workhorse models that assume full employment of factor endowments, Arko-
lakis et al. (2012) – henceforth, ACR – show that the welfare gains from trade can be inferred
from the share of expenditure on domestic goods and the trade elasticity; i.e. the elasticity
of imports with respect to variable trade costs. In our model, however, labor market frictions
imply that trade liberalization impacts real income via an additional channel, the employ-
ment rate. Importantly, the quantitative impact of this adjustment margin depends on the
goods market structure and on the existence of firm heterogeneity. Under monopolistic com-
petition with free entry, the welfare gains of changes in the employment rate depend inversely
on the elasticity of substitution in consumption. Intuitively, for a given share of domestic
expenditure, changes in the employment rate generate two effects: on aggregate income and
on consumer prices. The second effect operates via product variety, driven by entry and exit
decisions of firms responding to changes in aggregate expenditure. We show that, condi-
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tional on the trade elasticity, the magnitude of this second effect depends on whether firms
are homogeneous (Krugman (1980)) or heterogeneous (Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)).
Moreover, when the measure of consumption goods is fixed, only the first effect remains
active and our welfare formula nests two additional cases of interest: monopolistic compe-
tition with restricted entry and perfect competition (i.e. a multi-industry extension of Heid
& Larch (2016), for the Armington (1969) model with search and bargaining frictions).
Our second contribution is to obtain causal estimates of the two structural parameters
that regulate the welfare gains from trade in our model, the elasticity of substitution and
the trade elasticity. As we discuss below, these parameters also play crucial roles in a wide
range of models and applications in the literature and hence our empirical methodology
can, in principle, be applied well beyond the scope of this paper. We show that the two
key structural parameters can be identified from two wage elasticities: the wage elasticity
of firm-level domestic revenue and the wage elasticity of bilateral trade flows in a gravity
equation that holds at the local-labor-market level. To address the endogeneity of wages in
the two estimating equations, we propose an identification strategy that exploits exogenous
variation in production costs driven by differences in industrial composition across local labor
markets. Strategic bargaining between firms and workers implies that the local equilibrium
wage depends on the industrial composition of the labor market: local labor markets with
greater concentration of high-paying industries improve workers’ outside option and, ceteris
paribus, imply relatively higher costs for producers in any given industry. This property
of the model naturally leads us to use Bartik-style instruments for the local wage in the
estimating equations.
We implement our empirical methodology using firm-level data for Germany, spanning
24 local labor markets and 58 industries during 1993-2010. The Bartik instruments are
computed from a weighted average of national-level industrial wage premia, with weights
reflecting local industry employment composition in the initial year. Identification, there-
fore, stems from within-industry, across-city variation in local wages. For the instruments
to be valid, we require shocks to local labor markets as well as technological innovations to
be independent from local industrial composition in employment in the initial year. The
validity of our instruments therefore hinges on the exogeneity of the base-period local indus-
trial employment shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2017). To evaluate the quality of our
identification strategy, we propose a series of data-driven tests that consist in assessing the
relevance of our instruments and the correlation of our instruments with observables in the
base year. We also perform Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions. Overall, the results
from these tests support our instrumental variable strategy and the estimates we obtain are
remarkably stable over a variety of specifications.
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We estimate wage elasticities of -8 and -0.78 in the gravity and domestic revenue equa-
tions, respectively. From these, we recover an elasticity of substitution in consumption of
1.78 and a trade elasticity that ranges from 3.5 to 7, depending on the underlying micro de-
tails of the model. We find that OLS produces substantial biases, particularly in the gravity
equation. Moreover, since welfare is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution, our
IV estimate of 1.78 hints at the possibility that omitting labor market frictions and firm
heterogeneity might lead to a substantial underestimation of the welfare gains from trade.
Finally, we exploit the rise of trade with China and Eastern Europe between 1988 and
2008 to assess the quantitative importance of accounting for firm heterogeneity and changes
in unemployment when computing the gains from trade for local labor markets in West
Germany. Our ex-post welfare evaluations take the trade elasticity and changes in local
employment rates, domestic trade shares and industry composition as given by the data and
ask: how do the measured gains from trade between 1988 and 2008 differ when changes
in the employment rate are accounted for? The answer depends on the underlying market
structure and on the existence of firm heterogeneity. Indeed, under monopolistic competition
with free entry and firm heterogeneity, welfare gains in the frictional setting are 6% greater
than those predicted by ACR’s formula, for the median local labor market in West Germany.
In contrast, accounting for changes in the employment rate in frameworks with homogeneous
firms, monopolistic competition with restricted entry or perfect competition yield gains that
are around 3% larger.
The paper belongs to a growing literature that studies the interrelationship between
labor market outcomes and international trade. Our theoretical framework is related to
papers that introduce search frictions, as in Pissarides (2000), into the heterogeneous firms
model of Melitz (2003). Helpman & Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman et al. (2010) theoretically
examine the impact of trade liberalization on unemployment, wages and welfare but do not
attempt a quantitative assessment of the gains from trade. Helpman et al. (2017) structurally
estimate their model but focus on wage inequality rather than welfare. Our model departs
from Felbermayr et al. (2011) by considering asymmetric locations in terms of trade costs
and distributions of firm productivity. This feature allows us to escape from a separability
result established in Lemma 1 of Felbermayr et al. (2011), under which productivity cutoffs
and industry exports do not depend on local wages. In contrast, that link plays a central
role in our empirical strategy. S´wi ↪ecki (2017) extends ACR’s welfare formula in a Ricardian
model that features labor misallocation across industries. Since full employment still prevails
in equilibrium, welfare changes are independent of the employment rate – whereas their
dependence is a key feature of our theory.
A widely popular approach to estimating the trade elasticity relies on the gravity equa-
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tion for bilateral trade. In a broad class of models that comply with structural gravity
assumptions, Head et al. (2014) show that the trade elasticity can, in principle, be iden-
tified from variation in either bilateral trade costs (e.g. distance or tariffs) or, closer to
our approach, export “competitiveness” (e.g. wages or productivity). In both cases, the
central empirical challenge is finding reliable instruments that can be excluded from the
gravity equation. Similarly, the standard approach to estimating elasticities of substitution,
developed by Feenstra (1994), Broda & Weinstein (2006) and Soderbery (2015), requires no
correlation between the error terms in bilateral import demand and export supply equations,
a restrictive yet necessary assumption in the absence of exogenous supply shifters.
The novelty of our empirical approach is to propose model-based, Bartik-style instru-
ments that exploit wage and employment variation across industries and local labor markets
to identify the elasticity of substitution and the trade elasticity. Moreover, since our ap-
proach relies exclusively on within-country variation, the resulting estimates are less prone
to identification challenges that plague cross-country estimation of the gravity equation, in-
cluding reverse causality due to endogenous tariff protection and omitted variable bias due
to unmeasured institutional features of countries that are potentially correlated with trade
flows, tariffs and factor prices. As long as trade policy and institutions do not vary across
local labor markets within a country, their effects can be controlled for with an appropriate
set of fixed effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
framework. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 presents our counterfactual exercises. The final
section concludes. The Online Appendix contains theoretical derivations, details on the
linear approximations and additional empirical results.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Setup
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. Home (Germany) is composed of local labor
markets called cities, indexed by c ∈ {1, ..., C}. Since we do not observe export destinations in
the data, we assume that Foreign is a single economy with no internal barriers (the extension
is straightforward). We will use subscript n to denote a particular location irrespective of
its country and subscript F when referring specifically to Foreign.
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Demand. Each location n is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals of
mass L¯n with identical risk-neutral preferences, represented by a time-separable and station-
ary Cobb-Douglas instantaneous utility function defined over the consumption of I differen-
tiated goods. Time is discrete and denoted by t ≥ 1. The normative representative consumer
in market n maximizes
∑∞
t=1
∏I
i=1 (Yint)
αi/(1 + ρ)t, where αi is the share of expenditure on
good i, ρ > 0 is the discount factor and
Yint =
[∫
ω∈Ωint
qint(ω)
σi−1
σi dω
] σi
σi−1
, σi > 1,
is a CES index of the aggregate consumption qint(ω) of varieties ω ∈ Ωint of good i. σi
is the elasticity of substitution. The set Ωint may contain varieties produced in any city
(intranational trade) and Foreign (international trade). The composition and measure of
Ωint is determined endogenously if and only if there is free entry.
In a standard setting with sequential trading in complete one-period Arrow securities, the
aggregate consumption and equilibrium price of every differentiated good are time-invariant
if the aggregate consumer income is time-invariant. As in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz
(2003), our analysis is restricted to stationary equilibria and thus we henceforth suppress the
time subscript to ease notation.1 For good i in market n, the aggregate demand for variety
ω with price pin(ω) is
qin(ω) = Ainpin(ω)
−σi , (1)
where Ain = XinP
σi−1
in is the demand shifter, Xin is total expenditure and
Pin =
[∫
ω∈Ωin
pin(ω)
1−σidω
] 1
1−σi
is the price index.
Product Markets. For ease of exposition, we focus on analyzing a monopolistically
competitive setting with free entry and heterogeneous firms. We briefly discuss the special
cases of homogeneous firms with free or restricted entry and defer the details to the Online
Appendix. The latter also contains a complete treatment of the case of perfect competition
in the goods market under constant returns to scale.
1At this point, the reader may wonder about the rationale for setting up a dynamic, rather than static,
model if the analysis is restricted to stationary equilibria. Essentially, the dynamic setting allows us to have
a microfounded outside option for workers that depends on the probability of future transitions to alternative
jobs in the economy. This property plays a key role in our empirical strategy. In contrast, in a static search
framework outside options do not depend on the industrial composition of the economy.
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A competitive fringe of risk-neutral firms can acquire a blueprint to produce a unique
variety of good i in city c by incurring a sunk per-period investment fEic that terminates
in any period with exogeneous probability δc. To serve any market n, the firm must incur
an additional fixed cost ficn per period and a variable iceberg trade cost, such that τicn
units of the firm’s output must be produced per unit that arrives in market n. We assume
τicn ≥ τicc = 1 and that variable trade costs respect the triangular inequality for any three
locations. Fixed and entry costs are measured in units of (non-production) workers hired in
the domestic labor market.
Upon entry (but before incurring any fixed and variable costs), the firm discovers the
time-invariant productivity of its production workers, denoted ϕ, an independent draw from
a known distribution Gic(ϕ) with positive support. Firms thus operate under constant but
heterogeneous marginal returns to the variable input. All firms with the same productivity
behave symmetrically in equilibrium, hence we index firms and varieties by ϕ from now
onward. Prior to the beginning of the following period, the firm is hit by an i.i.d. shock that
forces it to exit with probability δc.
For the case of homogeneous firms, we consider a degenerate productivity distribution
and set fEic = ficn = 0. In addition, under free entry, there is a fixed startup cost fic that
depends on the industry and location of the producer. Alternatively, under restricted entry,
the mass of producers is exogenous.
Labor Market Frictions and Bargaining. Each individual in city c is endowed with
one unit of labor. In addition, we assume that workers are not mobile across cities, hence
L¯c represents the exogenous labor endowment in c.
2 The local labor market is characterized
by search frictions and wage bargaining, modeled as in Felbermayr et al. (2011). In each
period, firms post vacancies and all unemployed workers search. Matching is random and
determined by a linearly homogeneous matching function. mc(θc) denotes the vacancy filling
rate, a decreasing function of the vacancy-unemployment ratio (or labor market tightness)
θc. The job finding rate is θcmc(θc). Let kic denote the number of units of the numeraire that
firms must expend to post one vacancy; we henceforth refer to kic as the (unit) cost of posting
vacancies. The recruitment cost per matched worker is [kic/mc(θc)].
3 Matched workers enter
2This modelling approach is motivated by the lack of response of city-specific population size to trade
shocks in our empirical application (Section 6). Autor et al. (2013) report a similar finding across US local
labor markets. Redding & Rossi-Hansberg (2017) review a literature that allows for endogenous migration
in a class of quantitative spatial models similar to ours.
3We allow search costs to vary across cities through labor market tightness and across cities and industries
through the cost of vacancy postings. Mu¨hlemann & Leiser (2015), using detailed establishment-level survey
data from Switzerland, empirically show that costs associated with vacancy postings make up a significant
proportion of recruiting costs and vary substantially by industry.
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production in the following period. Before production takes place, wages are determined by
an intra-firm bargaining process that assumes the absence of binding employment contracts,
as in Stole & Zwiebel (1996).4 All payments are made at the end of each period. Workers
earn no income while unemployed.
2.2 The Firm’s Problem
We analyze the problem of a firm with productivity ϕ producing good i in city c. As antici-
pated, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria in which firm productivity distributions
and all aggregates remain constant through time. We proceed in three steps. First, taking
employment and export decisions as given, the firm seeks to maximize revenue by allocating
output optimally across destinations. This is a static problem that yields firm revenue as
a function of employment. Second, the firm solves a dynamic vacancy posting problem to
determine the profit-maximizing employment level, anticipating the effect of this decision on
the wage bargaining outcome. Finally, the firm makes entry and exit decisions, supplying all
locations that generate non-negative profits.
The (Conditional) Revenue Function. A firm with productivity ϕ and l production
workers allocates output to equalize marginal revenues across any two markets it serves. With
CES demand (1), the c.i.f. price in market n is then proportional to the domestic price; i.e.,
picn(ϕ) = τicnpicc(ϕ). This property enables a convenient aggregation of destination-specific
revenues that allows us to express the firm’s total revenue, ric(l;ϕ), as a function of l:
ric(l;ϕ) =
[∑
n
Iicn(ϕ)Ain (τicn)
1−σi
] 1
σi
(lϕ)
σi−1
σi , (2)
where Iicn(ϕ) is an indicator function equal to one when the firm supplies good i in market
n.
Optimal Vacancy Posting. Firms post vacancies, denoted v, in order to maximize the
present value of expected profits. Firm ϕ currently employing l production workers solves:
4Wage agreements can be renegotiated any time before production begins. A firm may fire an employee
or the latter may quit, in which case the worker immediately returns to the unemployment pool. During the
bargaining process, the firm cannot recruit additional workers. Once production begins, wage agreements
become binding. In equilibrium, wages are immune to intra-firm pairwise renegotiations.
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Πic(l;ϕ) = max
v
1
1 + ρ
{
ric(l;ϕ)− wic(l;ϕ)l − wic
∑
n
Iicn(ϕ)ficn − kicv + (1− δc) Πic(l′;ϕ)
}
,
s.t. l′ = l +mc(θc)v,
(3)
where l′ is the mass of production workers in the following period. wic(l;ϕ) is the wage
bargaining outcome, characterized below. Note that we allow the firm to internalize the
effect of employment size on the cost of recruiting production workers. For tractability,
however, we assume that the firm takes the wage of non-production workers wic as given
when solving (3) and impose wic = wic(l;ϕ) in equilibrium.
5
The first-order condition in problem (3),
(1− δc) ∂Πic(l
′;ϕ)
∂l′
=
kic
mc(θc)
, (4)
equates the expected marginal profit of hiring an additional worker to the recruitment cost
per worker. Equation (4) has two important implications. First, optimal employment size
is independent of current employment l and constant over time as long as the firm is not
forced to exit the market. In other words, employment in a firm that starts with no workers
reaches its optimal long-run level in the following period.6 Second, the marginal profit of
hiring an additional worker, ∂Πic(l;ϕ)/∂l, is equalized across firms, despite heterogeneity in
labor productivity. This result plays an important role in the outcome of the wage bargaining
process.
Bargaining. The firm and its workers engage in strategic wage bargaining as in Stole &
Zwiebel (1996), a generalization of Nash bargaining to the case of multiple workers. The value
of employment in a firm with productivity ϕ and l production workers, denoted Eic(l;ϕ),
5This condition ensures a closed-form solution for wic(l;ϕ) in the bargaining game while adhering to the
usual practice in the trade literature of measuring fixed costs in terms of domestic labor (e.g. Melitz (2003)
and Melitz & Redding (2014)). The assumption holds if, upon matching, an unemployed worker observes the
industry of the match and then chooses either (i) to work in a random firm in the industry as a production
worker or (ii) to competitively supply one unit of a homogeneous, non-tradable ‘market access’ service to
local firms as a non-production worker. In equilibrium, matched workers must be indifferent between the
two options, hence the (city-industry) wage for non-production workers will be equal to the expected wage
of production workers across firms in a given city-industry cell. Below we show that all firms in a given
city-industry cell pay the same wage, denoted wic, to production workers.
6The absence of transitional dynamics ensures sufficient analytical tractability to nest the ACR formula,
one of the key objectives of our theory. In particular, we rely on this property in the derivation of sufficient
statistics for welfare changes due to trade liberalization. We leave the study of transitional dynamics for a
future dedicated paper on this important topic.
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satisfies
(ρ+ δc) [Eic(l;ϕ)− Uc] = wic(l;ϕ)− ρUc, (5)
where Uc is the value of unemployment or outside option. The surplus splitting rule that
solves the the bargaining game can then be written as:
(1− βi) [Eic(l;ϕ)− Uc] = βi∂Πic(l;ϕ)
∂l
, (6)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) denotes the bargaining power of workers.7 Combining the revenue function
(2), the envelope condition from (3), the first-order condition (4) and the value of employment
(5), we can express the surplus-splitting rule (6) as a differential equation for the wage
schedule. Its solution is the Wage Curve:
wic = ρUc +
βi
(1− βi)
(
ρ+ δc
1− δc
)
kic
mc (θc)
. (7)
Three remarks are in order. First, the equilibrium wage does not vary across firms
within city-industry cells. Intuitively, firms adjust their labor force until the marginal profit
of hiring an additional worker is equalized across firms. By (6), this equalizes the value of
employment across firms. Wage equalization then follows from (5). Second, the city-industry
wage wic depends on the industrial composition of the labor market (quality of jobs) and on
the tightness of the labor market (quantity of jobs), via the worker’s outside option Uc. To
see this, let ηic denote the share of employment of industry i in city c. Then
ρUc =
θcmc (θc)
ρ+ δc
∑
i
ηic (wic − ρUc) . (8)
By (8), cities with greater concentration of high-wage industries improve workers’ outside
option and display, ceteris paribus, a higher bargained wage in any given industry i. Finally,
note that inter-industry wage differentials within local labor markets are driven by cross-
industry variation in bargaining power (βi) and costs of posting vacancies (kic).
Firm-level Outcomes. The stationarity of the vacancy posting problem implies that
firms face a constant cost per employee each period, denoted µic, equal to the wage plus the
7Note that the marginal surplus of the firm, ∂Πic(l;ϕ)/∂l, accounts for the impact of employing an
additional worker on the wage of the remaining production workers, a key feature of Stole & Zwiebel (1996).
Also note that the surplus is expressed in units of the numeraire.
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recruitment cost expressed on a per-period basis. In the Online Appendix, we show that
µic = wic +
(
ρ+ δc
1− δc
)
kic
mc (θc)
. (9)
Henceforth, we refer to µic as the cost of labor in industry i of city c.
Under CES demand, the profit maximizing revenue per worker is a fixed proportion
(σi − βi) / (σi − 1) of the cost of labor.8 This property enables closed-form solutions for all
firm-level equilibrium outcomes in terms of the cost of labor µic and demand shifters Ain. In
particular, the firm’s per-period revenue, denoted ric(ϕ), can be written as
ric(ϕ) =
(
σi − 1
σi − βi
)σi−1 [∑
n
Iicn(ϕ)Ain (τicn)
1−σi
](
ϕ
µic
)σi−1
. (10)
Note that the partial elasticity of firm-level revenue with respect to the local cost of labor is
fully determined by the elasticity of substitution, a property that we exploit in the empirical
analysis.
In turn, the per-period profit (gross of the entry cost) is
piic(ϕ) =
(
1− βi
σi − βi
)
ric(ϕ)− µic
∑
n
Iicn(ϕ)ficn. (11)
The per-period profit generated by entering any particular market n is computed by
switching the corresponding entry decision on (Iicn(ϕ) = 1) and off (Iicn(ϕ) = 0) in (11). The
existence of fixed costs of market access and the monotonicity of revenue in firm productivity
imply that there is a cutoff productivity level, denoted ϕ∗icn, such that a firm with productivity
ϕ enters market n if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗icn. The cutoff satisfies(
1− βi
σi − βi
)
ricn(ϕ
∗
icn) = µicficn ⇔ Λ0iAin (τicn)1−σi (ϕ∗icn)σi−1 (µic)−σi = ficn, (12)
where ricn(ϕ) denotes the sales of firm ϕ in market n and Λ
0
i > 0 is a function of parameters
σi and βi.
9
It is worth highlighting that with symmetric cities/locations, productivity cutoffs would
be independent of the tightness in the labor market, a separability result established in
Felbermayr et al. (2011).10 By relaxing symmetry across cities, we can circumvent this
8This is a usual property in static monopolistic competition models with CES demand and competitive
labor markets that leads to a constant mark-up pricing rule. In the Online Appendix section A.2, we verify
that it also holds in the current stationary setup with search and bargaining frictions.
9More specifically, Λ0i = (1− βi) (σi − 1)σi−1 / (σi − βi)σi .
10To see this, assume for a moment that countries are symmetric. In this case, equation (12) pins down the
10
result and allow the cost of labor (and hence outside options and the industrial composition
of the labor market) to have a feedback effect on equilibrium productivity distributions and
firm selection into export markets. As we show below, this property plays a crucial role in
our empirical approach to identifying key structural parameters that regulate the gains from
economic integration in our model.
2.3 Gravity
In this section, we show that the model delivers a sectoral gravity equation relating bilateral
trade flows to the cost of labor at the city level when firm productivity follows a Pareto
distribution. In the empirical analysis, we use the gravity equation to estimate key structural
parameters that regulate the welfare gains of economic integration.
We start by aggregating firm sales in industry i from city c to location n, denoted Xicn.
LettingM eic denote the mass of entrants in cell ic, we haveXicn = M
e
ic
∫∞
ϕ∗icn
ricn(ϕ)dGic(ϕ)/δc.
11
To eliminate M eic from the gravity equation, we focus on the share of exports in sectoral rev-
enue, XicF/Ric, where Ric ≡
∑
nXicn. Assume that Gic(ϕ) follows a Pareto distribution with
positive lower bound ϕmin,ic and shape parameter κi, where κi > σi − 1.12 Using equation
(10), we obtain
XicF
Ric
=
(ϕ∗icF )
−κi ficF∑
n (ϕ
∗
icn)
−κi ficn
. (13)
We can simplify this expression using the free entry and cutoff conditions. For cell ic, the
free entry condition equates the expected per-period profit for entrants to the expected per-
period entry cost, i.e.
∫∞
0
piic(ϕ)dGic(ϕ) = µicf
E
ic . Under Pareto productivity, this fixes the
denominator of (13).13 Using the export cutoff condition (12) to eliminate ϕ∗icF from the
numerator of (13), the latter becomes
XicF
Ric
= Λ1i
(
fEic
)−1
(ficF )
1− εi
σi−1
(
ϕmin,ic
τicF
)εi
(AiF )
εi
σi−1 (µic)
− εiσi
σi−1 , (14)
ratio of the export and domestic cutoffs in any industry independently of the cost of labor. In turn, it can be
shown that the (industry-specific) free entry condition provides a second equation for the two productivity
cutoffs that is independent of the cost of labor (e.g. the next section illustrates this for the case of Pareto
productivity distributions).
11This expression relies on the aggregate stability condition, which requires that the mass of successful
entrants (1−Gic(ϕicc))Meic exactly replaces the mass δcMic of producers who exit in each period.
12Note that we allow for Ricardian comparative advantage by letting the lower bound vary across cities
and industries.
13Under Pareto productivity, the free entry condition in cell ic simplifies to(
σi − 1
κi − σi + 1
)
(ϕmin,ic)
κi
∑
n
(ϕ∗icn)
−κi ficn = fEic .
11
where εi ≡ κi is the trade elasticity ; i.e. (the absolute value of) the partial elasticity of the
export share with respect to the variable trade cost. Λ1i > 0 is a function of parameters βi,
εi, σi and ρ.
14 Conditional on the demand shifter in Foreign, AiF , a higher cost of labor in
industry i in city c reduces its share of exports of this good by tightening firm selection into
the export market.15
The Wage Elasticity and Market Structure. The partial elasticity of the export share
with respect to the cost of labor µic plays an important role in the rest of this paper. In the
empirical section, we refer to it as the wage elasticity of the gravity equation, for reasons
that will become clear.
Under monopolistic competition, free entry and heterogeneous firms, the wage elasticity
depends on two structural parameters, the elasticity of substitution σi and the trade elasticity
εi. More generally, however, the structural interpretation of the wage elasticity depends on
the underlying market structure. Under the alternative market structures considered in the
Online Appendix, the wage elasticity is a sufficient statistic for the trade elasticity. For
example, we show that under monopolistic competition and homogeneous firms (with free
or restricted entry) the trade elasticity is equal to the wage elasticity minus one.
2.4 Welfare
In this section, we study the consequences of economic integration on the welfare of con-
sumers in city c. Holding intracity variable trade costs constant, we analyze otherwise ar-
bitrary shocks to variable trade costs, therefore spanning various forms of intranational and
international integration. We show that, when frictions in the local labor market are small,
the welfare consequences of economic integration can be approximated by a parsimonious
generalization of ACR’s welfare formula that features an additional adjustment margin, via
the employment rate.
Consumer preferences satisfy the Gorman form, hence there exists a normative represen-
tative consumer in every city. Recall that aggregate consumption and aggregate income are
constant in any stationary equilibrium. Therefore the indirect utility of the representative
14Specifically, Λ1i =
(
σi−1
εi−σi+1
)(
1−βi
σi−βi
) εiσi
σi−1
.
15Note that if µic increases (e.g. due to higher bargained wages or recruitment costs), not all cutoffs ϕ
∗
icn
in a given cell ic can increase because that would reduce profitability in all destinations, violating the free
entry condition. However, if Foreign’s demand shifter does not change (e.g. if the city is small relative to
the rest of the world), the export cutoff ϕ∗icF indeed increases, reducing the city’s export share of good i.
This observation underscores the importance of controlling for the demand shifter of the export market when
estimating the elasticity of the export share with respect to the cost of labor.
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consumer in city c, denoted Vc, is proportional to the per-period real income in the city:
Vc = ρ
−1
(
I∏
i=1
(αi)
αi
) ∑I
i=1 Licwic∏I
i=1 (Pic)
αi
,
where Lic is the mass of workers employed in industry i.
16
Trade Liberalization. Consider the effects of an arbitrary shock to the vector of variable
trade costs, {τivn} for any industry i and any two different locations n and v, on the welfare
of city c. For any endogenous variable x, let x˙ denote the ratio of x after the shock to x
before the shock; i.e. the proportional change in the stationary equilibrium value of x.
To enhance both comparability and analytical tractability, we focus on small deviations
from the benchmark frictionless settings typically considered in the literature. In particular,
suppose that the cost of posting vacancies in city c, kic, is small in all industries. Equation
(7) implies that interindustry wage differentials are small in city c; that is, wic ≈ wc for all
i, where wc is the average wage in c. Then
V˙c ≈ e˙cw˙c∏I
i=1
(
P˙ic
)
αi
, (15)
where ec is the employment rate in city c, i.e. ec =
∑
i Lic/Lc.
17 Note that V˙c is the equivalent
variation expressed as a fraction of the per-period income in the initial equilibrium.
The price index of any good i in city c depends on trade costs, costs of labor, technology
and mass of producers of good i in all other locations that supply city c. We follow ACR and
use city c’s domestic trade share, λicc ≡ Xicc/
∑
vXivc, as a sufficient statistic for the impact
of all these external effects on Pic. In the Online Appendix, we show that the proportional
change in the price index following the shock to variable trade costs is approximately
P˙ic ≈
(
λ˙icc
η˙1ic
) 1
εi
(e˙c)
−Υi w˙c, (16)
where ηic is industry i’s share of employment in city c. Υi and 1 are reduced-form parameters
16Under MC-RE, real income also includes positive aggregate profits. See Online Appendix.
17The Online Appendix shows that (15) also holds under monopolistic competition with restricted entry
if we impose βi ≈ β and σi ≈ σ ∀i. The latter ensure that the share of aggregate profits in aggregate labor
income is (approximately) constant across sectors and thus play the same role as macro-level restriction
R2(MS) in Arkolakis et al. (2012).
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that depend on the micro details of the model. In particular,
Υi =

1
σi−1 , under MC-FE-HET,
1
εi
, under MC-FE-HOM,
0, under PC or MC-RE,
where MC-FE-HET and MC-FE-HOM denote monopolistic competition settings with free
entry and either heterogeneous or homogeneous firms, respectively. MC-RE denotes monop-
olistic competition with restricted entry, with or without firm heterogeneity. PC denotes the
multi-industry extension of the perfectly competitive Armington model with search frictions
of Heid & Larch (2016); see Online Appendix. The exponent 1 in (16) is equal to one if
there is free entry (MC-FE-HET or MC-FE-HOM) and zero otherwise.
Equations (15) and (16) show that, conditional on λ˙icc, η˙ic and εi, changes in the em-
ployment rate e˙c impact both aggregate income and consumer prices. The latter operates
via product variety as a function of the structure of the goods market and the existence of
firm heterogeneity, as summarized by Υi. Under MC-FE, product variety is driven by entry
and exit decisions of firms responding to changes in domestic expenditure. Conditional on
the trade elasticity, however, the magnitude of this effect depends on whether firms are ho-
mogeneous (HOM) or heterogeneous (HET). Moreover, under PC or MC-RE, the measure
of consumption goods is fixed and hence changes in domestic expenditure have no effects on
product variety.
Substituting (16) in (15), we obtain the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the cost of posting vacancies, kic, is small in all industries of
city c. Then the welfare gains in city c associated with an arbitrary shock to the vector of
variable trade costs can be approximated as
V˙c ≈ (e˙c)1+
∑I
i=1 αiΥi
I∏
i=1
(
λ˙icc
η˙1ic
)−αi
εi
. (17)
Expression (17) nests the multi-sector welfare formula derived by ACR for versions of
the models considered in this paper that feature frictionless labor markets. In these cases,
e˙c = 1 because variable trade costs have no impact on aggregate employment. In our theory,
however, frictions in the labor market generate equilibrium unemployment and hence enable
an additional adjustment margin for welfare changes, via the employment rate.18 Note
18A closed-form characterization of this effect is not generally possible. In a symmetric version of our
model, however, Proposition 2 in Felbermayr et al. (2011) establishes conditions under which a bilateral
trade liberalization increases the steady-state employment rate. Note that the limited analytical tractability
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that quantifying welfare changes in the standard case of frictionless labor markets requires
estimating two structural parameters per industry, the expenditure share αi and the trade
elasticity εi. This also applies to (17) except under MC-FE-HET, which additionally requires
an estimate of the elasticity of substitution σi, the crucial parameter that regulates the impact
of employment rate changes on welfare.
Extension: Trade Liberalization and Labor Endowments. Next, consider the wel-
fare implications of arbitrary changes to the vectors of variable trade costs, {τivn}, and
labor endowments, {Ln}. The latter capture exogeneous patterns of migration or population
growth across locations.
We now focus on the equivalent variation per-capita to measure welfare changes in city c,
denoted V˙ PCc ≡ V˙c/L˙c. When the costs of posting vacancies are small, proportional changes
in per-capita income are still approximated by e˙cw˙c, the numerator in (15). A change in
the local endowment of labor L˙c, however, has an identical impact on domestic expenditure
-and, hence, on domestic price indexes- as a change in the employment rate. In the Online
Appendix, we show
V˙ PCc ≈ (e˙c)1+
∑I
i=1 αiΥi
(
L˙c
)∑I
i=1 αiΥi
I∏
i=1
(
λ˙icc
η˙1ic
)−αi
εi
. (18)
This extension of (17) enables the welfare analysis of episodes of economic integration that
trigger regional and/or international migration, in addition to changes in trade costs.
3 Empirical Strategy
The goal of this section is to develop the methodological steps required to take our welfare
formula to the data. Equation (17) depends on four variables that are, in principle, observable
(the employment rate in city c, the industrial shares of employment and domestic trade in
city c, and the industrial shares of expenditure) and on two structural parameters (σi and
εi).
19 Therefore, estimating the gains from trade first requires recovering these two structural
parameters. In a nutshell, we propose identifying them from the estimated wage elasticities
of our model is comparable to the literature; e.g. in quantitative trade models, it is not possible to sign
changes in labor allocations or domestic trade shares in response to an arbitrary change in variable trade
costs.
19Note that our empirical strategy does not rely on direct observation of the four above-mentioned variables.
In our empirical application, for example, we only observe the employment rate in city c and the share of
industrial employment in city c. Observability is a dataset-specific constraint that will nevertheless determine
the set of counterfactual exercises that may be implemented in a given dataset.
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of the firm-level domestic revenue and local gravity equations. In what follows, we discuss
this empirical strategy in detail.
In the model, the elasticity of substitution and the trade elasticity are industry-specific.
However, estimating industry-specific coefficients places too high of a demand on our data.
We therefore estimate weighted average values of these parameters, which we simply refer
to as σ and ε. Later, when we discuss our results, we will be more formal about how our IV
estimates of these coefficients approximate a weighted average of heterogeneous treatment
effects, in line with the interpretation in Borusyak et al. (2018).
To make progress toward an empirical specification of our main equations, we first use
equation (9) to establish a log-linear approximation to the unobservable cost of labor µic,
around the point where the latter is constant across cities. Using the Beveridge curve to
express the tightness of the labor market θc as a one-to-one function of the employment rate
ec, we obtain:
lnµic = ψi0 + lnwic + ψi1kic + ψi2ec, (19)
where ψi0, ψi1 and ψi2 are industry-specific parameters obtained in the linear approxima-
tion.20
Expression (19) allows us to rewrite the gravity equation (14) as a log-linear function of
the observable industry-city specific log wage. Adding time subscripts (since we use data at
the city-industry-year level) and first-differencing over time yields:
∆ ln
(
XicF t
Rict
)
= ∆dGit + φ
G
1 ∆ lnwict + φ
G
i2∆ect + ∆u
G
ict, (20)
where φG1 is the wage elasticity of the local gravity equation; e.g. φ
G
1 = − κσ(σ−1) , under
MC-FE-HET, and where φGi2 = φ
G
1 ψi2.
To capture the industry specificity of φG2i, we interact changes in the employment rate
with industry fixed effects. The term ∆dGit is a full set of industry-year effects to capture
changes in the demand shifter in Foreign, AiF t. Moreover, the inclusion of ∆d
G
it allows
to control for time-varying industry-specific unobserved variables, such as changes in the
industry component of the cost of posting vacancies, fixed costs, trade policy, non-tariff
barriers to trade or (national-level) comparative advantage. The error term, ∆uGict, is a log-
linear function of shocks to the industry-city-specific residual components in kict, f
E
ict, ficF t,
ϕmin,ict and τicF t, which are collected in the error term after controlling for ∆d
G
it . The time
20Details of the linear approximation of the cost of labor can be found in the Online Appendix C.1.
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differencing operator ∆ eliminates time-invariant industry-city effects; e.g. local or industrial
fixed comparative advantage stemming from geography, institutions or technology.
Given this specification, the estimated effects of our wage variable exploit within-industry,
over-time variation, conditional on the local employment rate. Intuitively, this means that we
identify the impact of local wage costs, φG1 , by comparing changes in the ratio of exports to
revenues for firms in the same industry in two different cities that are experiencing different
changes in wages. The fact that we hold the employment rate constant in this specification
implies that the type of variation in wages that we want to use comes from shifts in the
wage curve, equation (7), at a fixed labor market tightness. This ensures that shifts in wages
correspond to changes in the cost of labor, µic, that firms face (ie, not an equilibrium wage-
tightness response). In the model, shifts in the cost of labor will induce firm entry and exit
responses, as implied by equations (12) and (13). These responses will be reflected by shifts
in the ratio of exports to revenues at the city-industry level, captured by the coefficient φG1 .
The domestic revenue equation at the firm level can be obtained similarly using equations
(10) and (19):
∆ ln rict(ϕ) = ∆d
R
it + φ
R
1 ∆ lnwict + T (ϕ) + φ
R
i2∆ect + ∆ ln A˜ict + ∆u
R
ict(ϕ), (21)
where φR1 = 1 − σ, φRi2 = φR1 ψi2. T (ϕ) denotes firm fixed effects that capture firm-
specific linear trends in (log) productivity lnϕt. As in the gravity equation, we inter-
act ∆ect with industry fixed effects to capture the fact that φ
R
2i varies across industries.
A˜ict ≡
∑
n6=F Aint (τicnt)
1−σ is an aggregate domestic demand shifter. We proxy for it using
the traditional Bartik variable, defined as in Bartik (1991) and popularized in Blanchard &
Katz (1992), interacted with industry fixed effects.21 ∆uRict(ϕ) is an error term that collects
residual variation in the cost of posting vacancies kict after accounting for industry-year fixed
effects ∆dRit .
22
Identification of φG1 and φ
R
1 requires isolating variation in industry-city log wages that
is orthogonal to the composite error terms, ∆uGict and ∆u
R
ict(ϕ), respectively. Under search
and bargaining frictions, wages are necessarily endogenous in equations (20) and (21) be-
cause wages, domestic revenues and export shares all depend on idiosyncratic changes in
the vacancy posting cost. Thus, estimating (20) and (21) by ordinary least squares would
yield inconsistent estimates of φG1 and φ
R
1 . Next, we show how to exploit the structure of the
model to obtain instruments for wages.
21We interpret the traditional Bartik variable as a predictor of changes in city c’s income. To motivate
our proxy, we note that A˜ict can be written as the product of an industry-specific term and city c’s income,
when cities are symmetric.
22The domestic revenue equation is obtained by setting Iicn = 1 for n 6= F and zero otherwise in (10) and
then inserting (19).
17
3.1 Industrial Composition and Wages
The first step is to link the industry-city wage to the industrial composition of the local labor
market. In our search and bargaining framework, this link is captured by the worker’s outside
option. To simplify the exposition, we impose constant exit rates and bargaining power, i.e.
δc = δ and βi = β. The latter implies that inter-industry wage differentials within local labor
markets stem solely from differences in recruitment costs, kic. Substituting equation (8) in
equation (7) yields
wic = γ˜1cw¯c + γ2ckic, (22)
where w¯c =
∑
j ηjcwjc is the local average wage and the coefficients γ˜1c =
θcmc(θc)
ρ+δ+θcmc(θc)
∈ {0, 1}
and γ2c =
(
β
1−β
) (
ρ+δ
1−δ
)
1
mc(θc)
are both dependent on the tightness of the local labor market.
The latter coefficient is increasing in labor market tightness – workers benefit more from
hiring costs when firms find it harder to hire. The equation shows that workers in any
sector benefit from working in a city with higher wages (quality of jobs) due to the strategic
complementarity of wages across industries generated by search frictions and bargaining in
the labor market (Beaudry et al., 2012). Since the coefficient γ˜1c is an increasing function of
labor market tightness, this benefit depends on the quantity of jobs.
We can rewrite equation (22) by decomposing the vacancy posting cost, kic, without loss
of generality, as kic = k˜i + k˜c + ξ˜ic, where k˜i represents a common (across cities) industry
component, k˜c represents city-specific component, and ξ˜ic is an idiosyncratic component that
sums to zero across industries, within cities. Using this decomposition, solving for w¯c and
substituting back in equation (22), we obtain:
wic = γ1cK˜c + (γ1c + γ2c)k˜c + γ1c
∑
j
ηjcξ˜jc + γ2ck˜i + γ2cξ˜ic, (23)
where K˜c =
∑
j ηjck˜j captures the weighted city-average of national-level vacancy posting
costs and γ1c =
γ˜1c·γ2c
1−γ˜1c . Note that γ1c and γc2 vary by city because of equilibrium differences
in the rate at which workers find jobs. These coefficients can be written as an increasing func-
tion of the observable employment rate, which is a one-to-one function of the unobservable
tightness of the labor market (Beveridge curve).
To derive an empirical specification in logs, we take a log-linear approximation of equation
(23) around an expansion point in which the cost of posting vacancies is small. Adding the
time subscript, industry-city wages are related to industrial composition in the following
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way:
lnwict = γ0 +
γ1
γ2
Kct + γ2kit + γ3kct + γ4ect + γ2ξict, (24)
where γ0-γ4 are constant parameters obtained from the linear approximation, kit =
k˜it
w
,
kct =
k˜ct
w
and ξict =
ξ˜ict
w
, where w is the average wage in an arbitrary industry.23 Equation
(24) shows that, at the national level, inter-industry wage differentials are given by γ2kit,
which expresses the average wage in industry i relative to the average wage in an arbitrary
omitted industry. Finally, Kct =
∑
j ηjctνjt, where νjt = γ2kjt denotes the national industry
wage premium. Thus, Kct is a weighted average of industrial wage premia, weighted by
industry-city-specific employment shares.
The term Kct plays an essential role in our identification strategy. Since the probability
that an unemployed worker finds a job in industry i and city c is proportional to ηict, the
term Kct can be thought of as capturing variation in workers’ outside option driven by the
industrial composition of city c; i.e., by city c’s specialization pattern across industries that
pay intrinsically different wage premia. When the composition of jobs shifts toward higher-
paying industries, workers are able to extract more surplus from firms when bargaining
through an increase in their threat point. Crucially for the identification strategy, conditional
on the employment rate and demand shifter, variation in industrial composition influences
trade flows and firm revenues only through their impact on local wages. Beaudry et al.
(2012) show that outside options are important determinants of industry-city wages in the
U.S.. Tschopp (2015, 2017) finds similar results in Germany. Next, we discuss how to exploit
variation in Kct to construct model-based instruments for the industry-city wage in equations
(20) and (21).
3.2 Instrumental Variables
Our identification strategy exploits variation in Kct and hinges on the following decomposi-
tion:
∆Kct =
∑
j
ηjct−1(νjt − νjt−1) +
∑
j
νjt(ηjct − ηjct−1).
This decomposition is the starting point for our instruments, which, by exploiting the
inner structure of the index Kct, are, essentially, Bartik-type instruments, as defined by
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017). The first term captures shifts in national-industrial pre-
23See Online Appendix C.2 for details on the linear approximation and specific expressions of γ0-γ4.
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mia, weighted by the beginning-of-period importance of an industry to the local economy.
The second term captures changes in workers’ outside options from shifts in the local indus-
trial composition, weighed by the national industrial wage premia.
In order to construct instruments using the decomposition of ∆Kct, we must confront
two issues: (1) the national industrial premia, νit, are not directly observed, and (2) the
observed industrial employment shares, ηict, are potentially correlated with the error terms
in (20) and (21). We tackle these two issues next.
Estimating National Wage Premia. Equation (24) shows that wages vary because of
an industry-specific component (νit), a city-specific component (γ0 +
γ1
γ2
Kct + γ3kct + γ4ect)
and an idiosyncratic term (γ2ξict). An implication is that the inclusion of a set of city fixed
effects in a wage regression at the industry-city level would allow us to recover national
industrial wage premia from the estimated coefficients on industry fixed effects, without
directly observing local industrial composition, Kct, and the local component of the vacancy
posting cost, kct.
However, in order to take the model’s wage equation to the data, we must confront the
fact that workers are heterogeneous in our data but not in the model. Our approach is to
treat individuals as representing different bundles of efficiency units of labor, and assume
these bundles are perfect substitutes in production. We interpret wict in (24) as the cost
per effective labor unit and index worker characteristics by Hn. Let effective labor units
be exp(H ′nβ + an), where Hn and an capture observable and unobservable skills of worker
n, respectively. Adding industry, city and time subscripts, workers log wages, lnWnict, are
given by:
lnWnict = H
′
ntbt + lnwnct + anict.
This implies that we can estimate national industrial wage premia using the following
procedure. First, we estimate, separately by year:
lnWnict = H
′
ntbt +Dict + anict, (25)
where Dict are a complete set of city-industry dummies. In our empirical application, H
′
nt
includes age, the square of age, a gender dummy, a nationality dummy, a categorical variable
for education and a full set of education-gender, education-nationality and education-age
interactions. The estimated vector coefficients on the city-industry fixed-effects, Dict, are
regression-adjusted city-industry average wages, which we denote by ̂lnwict.
Pooling across years, we then estimate an empirical version of (24), regressing ̂lnwict on
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a set of city-year and industry-year fixed effects. The inclusion of the city-year fixed effects
absorbs local economic conditions given by γ0 +
γ1
γ2
Kct + γ3kct + γ4ect in equation (24) and
the coefficients on the industry-year fixed-effects estimate the national-level industrial wage
differentials, νˆit.
Predicting Shares. Since we have many industries within each city-year, we pursue a
generalized leave-one-out method that purges a common city component from the national-
level industry growth. The procedure that we use closely follows Greenstone et al. (2015).
Consider the following equation for local industry-city employment growth:
∆ lnLict = git + gct + g˜ict, (26)
where gct are city-time fixed effects and git are industry-year effects. This equation describes
local industry employment growth as stemming from national-level factors common across
cities (git), city-level factors that are common across industries (gct), and an idiosyncratic
city-industry factor (g˜ict). The inclusion of gct is meant to absorb growth due to conditions in
the local economy, such as demand shocks. The vector of coefficients on the git fixed-effects
are associated with national-level forces. We use their estimates, denoted gˆit, to predict local
industry size based on local base-period employment:
Lˆict = Lic0
t∏
s=1
(1 + gˆis) ,
for t ≥ 1, where Lic0 is a base-period level of employment in industry i in the local economy
c. We then convert predicted employment into shares.
In order to alleviate any concerns that the correlation between our instruments and
manufacturing wages is mechanical (since equations 20 and 21 are estimated using industries
in the tradables sector), we exploit variation in the decomposition of ∆Kct that originates
outside the tradable sectors and construct instruments based on the non-manufacturing
sector only. For this reason, we construct industrial shares within the non-manufacturing
sector so the shares across industries within the non-manufacturing sector of a city sums to
one:
ηˆjct =
Lˆjct∑
i∈S Lˆict
,
where S denotes the set of non-manufacturing industries.
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Constructing Instruments. With ηˆjct and νˆjt at hand, we construct
IV Wct =
∑
j∈S
ηˆjct−1∆νˆjt,
IV Bct =
∑
j∈S
νˆjt∆ηˆjct,
where ηˆjct are only functions of base period shares and national growth rates. Variation in
both IV Wct (the ‘within’ instrument) and IV
B
ct (the ‘between’ instrument) across cities comes
from differences in initial local non-manufacturing industrial composition.
Each one of our instruments takes the form of the popular Bartik-type instruments that
combine observed shocks (common across local labor markets) with exposure weights at
the local level. Recently, several papers have examined these types of instruments in detail
and formalized the conditions under which they are valid (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2017;
Borusyak et al., 2018; Beaudry et al., 2012, 2018). Following this research, we outline the
conditions under which our instruments are valid in our context. First, notice that the inclu-
sion of industry-by-year fixed effects in our specifications imply that the identifying variation
we are using is across cities, within-industry variation. The implication is that instrument
validity concerns the cross-city correlation between IV Wct or IV
B
ct and the error ∆u
G
ict. Second,
note that, by construction of ηˆict, all of the cross-city variation in the instruments stems from
differences in the initial industrial composition, ηic,t=0. Thus, a sufficient condition for our
instruments to be valid is that cross-city differences in base-period industrial composition
are uncorrelated with the error term – a condition emphasized in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2017) and Beaudry et al. (2018).
More formally, consider the sample covariance between our within-instrument and the
error of the gravity equation:
1
I
1
C
∑
c
∑
i 6∈S
(∑
j∈S
ηˆjct−1∆νjt
)
∆uGict =
1
I
1
C
∑
i 6∈S
∑
j∈S
∆νjt
∑
c
ηˆjct−1∆uGict (27)
where the last summation on the right-hand-side is the city-level covariance between pre-
dicted non-manufacturing shares and the error term. Predicted shares are only a func-
tion of base-period non-manufacturing industrial composition and national-level industrial
growth rates. The error term contains changes in the residual component of a number
of model parameters, and can be generally interpreted in our framework as changes in
city-industry unobservable comparative advantage. A sufficient condition for consistency
is that 1
C
∑
c ηˆjct−1∆u
G
ict →p E[ηˆjct−1∆uGict] = 0 as C → ∞. In words, if base-period non-
manufacturing industrial composition does not predict future changes in comparative ad-
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vantage in manufacturing industries, our instrument is valid. Thus, our instruments would
be valid, for example, under a random-walk type assumption for ∆uGict, as emphasized in
Beaudry et al. (2012, 2018). Recently, Borusyak et al. (2018) have shown that even if this
condition breaks down, Bartik-style instruments may still be valid. In their paper, they
emphasize the conditions under which 1
C
∑
c ηˆjct−1∆u
G
ict is asymptotically non-zero, but the
industry shocks are uncorrelated to this covariance term. They show that if the industry-
level shocks are as-good-as-randomly assigned, conditional on E[ηˆjct−1∆uGict], the condition
for instrument validity is still satisfied. In our framework, this condition would hold if ηˆjct−1
predicted ∆uGict, but the industry wage shock, ∆νit, is uncorrelated with these predictions,
so that
∑
j∈S ∆νjtE[ηˆjct−1∆u
G
ict] is zero.
The sufficient conditions for IV consistency are therefore either an assumption that base-
period non-manufacturing industrial composition does not predict future changes in compar-
ative advantage or an assumption that the industry level shocks are as-good-as random with
respect to E[ηˆjct−1∆uGict]. While we cannot test these assumptions directly, we do attempt to
assess their plausibility in several ways. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017); Borusyak et al.
(2018) suggest checking whether observable baseline city-level characteristics are correlated
with the instruments as an indirect exogeneity assessment. The idea is that if the Bartik-style
instruments are correlated with baseline local characteristics that might be might be corre-
lated to the structural error term in the estimating equation, then the consistency condition
might not be met. In addition, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017); Borusyak et al. (2018) sug-
gest controlling for base-period observable characteristics interacted with time trends when
estimating 2SLS using the Bartik instruments. Borusyak et al. (2018), in particular, recom-
mends an analysis at the industry level and controlling for industry level controls. Since our
specification is at the city-industry level, we control for a full set of industry-by-year fixed
effects, and specifically control for baseline or lagged manufacturing share.
Finally, we leverage the fact that we have two instruments and perform an over-identification
test as done in Beaudry et al. (2012, 2018). As they discuss, each instrument uses a different
type of variation, but are valid under the same identification assumption. In particular, each
instrument can be seen as combining an industry-level shock with a local measure of expo-
sure. Consistency depends on the orthogonality of the local measure of exposure (base-period
non-manufacturing composition) and the error term. Given that each instrument weights
potential violations of this assumption differently, if our orthogonality condition is not sat-
isfied, estimates using either IV W or IV B should diverge. Using this insight, performing a
standard over-identification test tests whether the instruments produce statistically different
estimates. Note that this test is consistent with the theoretical framework. Each instrument
should have the same impact on wages, because they both influence the outside options of
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workers in the same way regardless of whether the variation stems from shifts in industrial
premia, IV W , or because of shifts in industrial composition, IV B. Likewise, what matters
for firms is the bargained wage, so that each instrument should produce the same response
on the firms’ side. Thus, we expect that each instrument should produce similar estimates
of the wage response in our structural equation.
4 Data
This study uses two different data sources: the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated
Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) [Years 1975 - 2010] and the Linked-Employer-Employee
Data (LIAB) [cross-sectional model 2 1993-2010 (LIAB QM2 9310)] from the Institute of
Employment Research (IAB). Data access was on-site at the Research Data Centre (FDZ)
of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the University of Michigan, the Cornell
Institute for Social and Economic Research and subsequently via remote data access.24
SIAB Data. The SIAB data is a 2% random sample of individual accounts drawn from
the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) data file assembled by the IAB. These data
cover all employees registered by the German social insurance system and subject to social
security. Civil servants and self-employed workers are not covered. The SIAB provide spell-
data information on individual characteristics as such as gender, year of birth, nationality or
education, and document a worker’s entire employment history, e.g. an individual’s employ-
ment status, full- or part-time status, occupational status, occupation and daily wage. Hours
of work are not included in the IEB. Earnings exceeding the contribution assessment ceiling
for social insurance are only reported up to this limit.25 Administrative individual data are
supplemented with workplace basic information taken from the Establishment History Panel
(BHP). Establishment variables are measured on June 30 of each year and include infor-
mation on location, industry, year of first and last appearance of the establishment, total
number of employees, number of full employees, number of part-time employees and median
wage of the establishment. Establishment and individual data are merged using employment
spells which cover June 30.
LIAB Data. The LIAB data matches the IAB Establishment Panel data with individual
social security data from the IAB on June 30 and comprises data from a representative
annual establishment survey, stratified according to establishment size, industry and federal
24See Heining et al. (2013), Fischer et al. (2009) and Heining et al. (2014) for further data documentation.
25We drop top coded observations.
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state. The survey provides information on establishment-level exports, employment and
other performance-related measures, such as sales. For consistency with theory, we refer to
these establishments as firms in the empirical analysis.
Cities and Industries. We define cities according to Kropp & Schwengler (2011) defini-
tion of labor markets. There are 24 cities; 19 in West Germany and 5 in East Germany.26
There are 58 industries (“Abteilungen”), of which 29 belong to the manufacturing sector,
grouped according to the 1993 time-consistent 3-digit classification of economic activities.
In compliance with the FDZ guidelines, each industry-city cell includes at least 20 workers’
observations.
Contruction of the Main Variables. We use the LIAB data to construct industry-
city-specific export shares in revenues and firm-level domestic revenues. We first compute
firm-level export values using sales and the share of exports in sales, which are both available
at the firm level in the LIAB data. Firm-level domestic revenues are obtained by substracting
exports from sales. The industry-city export shares are obtained by aggregating firm revenues
and exports by industry-city-year, weighting each observation using the weights provided in
the establishment survey.
The SIAB data are used to construct industry-city wages, national industrial wage premia,
predicted and observed local industrial employment shares, instruments, local employment
rates, demographic controls and our proxy for local demand. These variables are then merged
to the LIAB data by the Institute of Employment research.
Adjusted wages, predicted employment shares and instruments are constructed following
the procedure described in Section 3.2. To estimate log industry-city wages from the wage
regression at the worker level we first transform wages into real wages using the consumer
price index, base 2005, provided by the German federal statistical office. Among the variables
included in the vector of individual characteristics, our educational variable includes the
following categories: without vocational training, apprenticeship, high school with Abitur,
high school without Abitur, polytechnic, university. The nationality variable is restricted to
two categories; German nationals and foreigners. In the second step which estimates the
national industrial wage premia, we weigh observations by the size of the city-industry in
the base-period so that the influence of each observation is proportional to its importance in
that year.
To predict local industry size, we average industry-city employment over the period 1992-
26Kropp & Schwengler (2011) correspondence table between districts, labor markets and regions can be
downloaded at http://www.iab.de/389/section.aspx/Publikation/k110222301.
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1993, i.e. Lic0 = (Lic1992 + Lic1993) /2. We then leave one year out and first predict employ-
ment, Lˆict, in 1995, which restricts our sample to the period 1996-2010 since IV Bct and
IV Wct both use t− 1 predicted employment shares.
Finally, we proxy changes in local demand, ∆ lnAict, in the domestic revenue equation
by interacting industry fixed effects with the traditional Bartik variable, constructed as a
weighted sum of national-level industrial employment growth, where the weights are past
local industrial shares.
5 Results
Gravity Equation Table 1 presents the estimation results for the gravity equation (20)
that relates the change in log share of exports in sectoral revenue to log changes in local sec-
tor wages. As this equation is derived from theory, the coefficient on ∆wict has a structural
interpretation that depends on the market structure; e.g. equal to κσ
(σ−1) under MC-FE-HET.
Note that all specifications in Table 1 contain a full set of industry-by-year fixed effects
and the local employment rate fully interacted with industry fixed effects. Given this spec-
ification, the estimated structural parameter is identified from within-industry, over-time
variation in wages, holding local labor market tightness constant. The first column of Table
1 shows the OLS estimates of the gravity equation. As discussed above, wages are mechan-
ically endogenous in this equation and under no circumstances would we expect to recover
consistent estimates of the parameter of interest; we present them only for completeness.
Thus, we turn our attention to columns (2)-(7) which contain the second-stage results of the
gravity equation when we instrument for wages.
Before discussing the second-stage estimates in Table 1, it is useful to briefly discuss
our first-stage estimates and identification. Our instrumental variable strategy identifies
movements in ∆ lnwict from shifts in workers’ outside options proxied by IV
B
ct and IV
W
ct .
Intuitively, this means that we identify the sensitivity of trade to wages by comparing firms
in the same industry in different cities that experienced different changes in their predicted
industrial composition, and therefore costs of labor via bargaining. Since our instruments
use a different level of variation than our dependent variable (city-year versus industry-city-
year), all of our estimates in Table 1 report standard errors that are clustered. We report
standard errors based on two choices of clustering: at the city-year level, the lowest level of
clustering that would potentially be appropriate given the variation of our instruments, and
two-way clustered standard errors at the city-year and industry-city level.27 The stars (∗) in
27While city-year clustering takes into account the level of variation that we use, this choice neglects
potential serial correlation in our dependent variable. Thus, our two-way clustered standard errors also
26
the table refer to city-year clustering.
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Panel II of Table 1 reports our first-stage estimates from a variety of specifications. Both
IV Wct and IV
B
ct are statistically significant in all columns. The bottom panel of the table
shows the F -statistic of the test that our instruments jointly have no explanatory power;
the null hypothesis of this test can easily be rejected. For example, the lowest F -statistic of
the test of instrument relevancy across all specifications is 58.9 and, thus, we do not suffer
from week instrument problems. This can be viewed as a direct test of our model; i.e. it
tests that our proxies for outside options in a city matter for industry-city wage growth
which is implied by our search and bargaining model of the labor market. This result is
in line with Tschopp (2015, 2017) who extensively examines the relationship between local
industrial composition and wage formation in Germany. In column (3), we add a full set of
city-fixed effects which, in our differenced specification, are equivalent to city-specific trends.
Once these are added, the coefficients on IV Wct and IV
B
ct are nearly the same magnitude,
and this does not change across additional specifications in the table. This result is intuitive
and implied by our framework – shifts in outside options stemming from shifts in industrial
composition or national-level wage premia should have the same impact on wages.
Panel I of Table 1 contains the second-stage results for the gravity equation. In column
(2), the estimated coefficient on wages is -7.98 and this magnitude remains relatively stable
across all of our specifications and is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. In column
(3) we add a full set of city-fixed effects. These are meant to capture any variation in within-
city exports that are city-specific over time; for example, trends in exports that are driven by
secular factors such as increasing global integration that differentially impacts cities. Column
(4) adds linear city trends which are meant to pick up trends in export growth across cities.
Columns (5) and (6) control for either lagged manufacturing share or linear trends base-
period manufacturing share. Recall that we restrict variation in our instruments by only
using information on industries outside the tradables sector. Thus, these specifications assess
whether we are inadvertently picking up wage movements due to shocks correlated to city-
level manufacturing concentration. Finally, in column (7) we include a set of demographic
controls interacted with time trends. These demographic controls are constructed at the city-
level in the base time period (1992/93) and include the local share of college graduates, female
workers and native Germans, and the log employment rate and log size of the labour force.
cluster at the industry-city level to take into account potential serial correlation, in addition to city-year.
Standard errors based on clustering at the city level yield smaller standard errors, in general, than reported
in our table. Since city-clustered standard errors are based on few clusters and are generally smaller, we take
the more conservative approach and choose not to report them (available upon request).
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Since our identification strategy relies on exploiting base-period differences in industrial
composition across cities, any trend or shock that is correlated to these city characteristics
could also be correlated with the instruments, therefore potentially violating the exclusion
restriction. For example, if base-period industrial employment is correlated with the local
share of highly educated workers, this specification addresses potential concerns that other
trends associated with education confound our results.28 These additional controls do not
have an appreciable effect on our coefficient estimates.
It is useful to interpret these results through the lens of our model. Our 2SLS estimates of
the gravity equation instrument changes in city-industry wages with measures of the change
in the value of workers’ outside options. These outside options depend on predicted shifts
in the industrial structure (IV Bct ) and shifts in the national-level industry premia (IV
W
ct ).
Improvements in workers’ outside options lead to higher bargained wages and, thus, higher
unit costs faced by producers at fixed labor market tightness. Conditional on foreign demand,
export shares in industry i in city c fall when unit costs increase. The magnitude of this effect
is governed by the wage elasticity, and our estimates suggest that a one percent increase in
labor costs reduces export shares by about 8 percent. Given that we expect the response of
trade to wages to vary across industries (ie, that ε and σ have i subscripts as in the model),
we interpret this estimate as a weighted average of the wage response across industries.29
This interpretation of our results, of course, relies on the idea that our instruments are
exogenous. As discussed in section 3.2, a sufficient condition for our instruments to be valid
is that base-period industrial composition is orthogonal to the error term in the gravity
equation. The identification strategy we exploit is analogous to difference-in-differences
with a continuous treatment exposure. The ‘treatment’ in our setup comes from national-
level shocks in industrial growth rates (git from equation (26)) and industrial premia, νˆit,
interacted with the exposure to these shocks given by base-period industrial structure. Thus,
all of the cross-city variation in our instruments comes from differences in initial industrial
composition. We combine this variation with two different types of national-level shocks to
produce two different weighted averages, each corresponding to a component in ∆Kct which
proxies for the value of workers’ outside options. According to our theoretical framework,
each instrument should have the same impact on wages since each influences worker outside
28Following Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017), we conduct a more detailed investigation of city initial-
characteristics and industrial composition in the Online Appendix D.2.
29As Borusyak et al. (2018) show, our Bartik-style or shift-share IV approach estimates a weighted average
of unit specific treatment effects. As the coefficient on wages only varies across industries, our approach is
analogous to estimating our gravity equation by industry and then averaging. Thus, what we estimate is
an average of an industry specific effect. Since our regressions are weighted by the number lagged number
of establishments in each city-industry cell, this is a weighted average. Section E of the Online Appendix
formally shows this result.
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options in the same way. In fact, in Panel II of Table 1 we do find that each instrument has a
similar impact on wages. Likewise, what matters for firms is the cost of labor, suggesting that
using variation either instrument should produce the same export response. This intuition
can be formalized by performing a standard Hansen’s-J over-identification test which tests
whether estimates using either IV Wct or IV
B
ct are statistically different. In the bottom panel
of Table 1 we present the p-value of this test. In every specification we fail to reject the null
that our instruments are exogenous, which lends support for our identifying assumption.30
Revenue Equation In table 2 we present our results from the estimation of the domestic
revenue equation (21). This equation is estimated at the firm level using the same sample of
cities and industries over the 1996-2010 period as above. Each specification again includes
a full set of industry-by-year fixed effects, but also includes a full-set of firm fixed effects.
The inclusion of the firm fixed effects is intended to capture the extra term in the error
component of (21), denoting time-varying firm productivity, that is not present in (20). One
complication of estimating the revenue equation, relative to the gravity equation, is that
equation (21) contains a domestic demand shifter that cannot be absorbed by a fixed effect.
We attempt to control for this demand shifter by including the traditional Bartik instrument,
which is a proxy for local labor demand, interacted with a full-set of industry indicators.31
In this specification, the coefficient on wages has the structural interpretation of one minus
the elasticity of substitution in consumption, 1 − σ, and identification again comes from
within-industry, over-time variation in the price of labour.
The layout of Table 2 is similar to Table 1 above, with columns 2-7 containing the results
from two-stage least squares and each column controlling for the same set of controls as
in Table 1. Panel II of the table displays the first-stage coefficients of our instruments
and indicates that we do not face weak instrument problems. In column (2) of Panel I,
the estimate of σ is about 1.75 and highly statistically significant and very stable across
30When we estimate the specifications in Table 1 using either IVWct or IV
B
ct as an instrument, the results
are very similar to those presented the table. For example, in our baseline specification using IV Bct , the
coefficient on wage is -8.07 (3.86). The corresponding result using IVWct is -7.73 (2.78). Given that the
correlation between our instruments in the data is low (0.3, after removing year effects as we do in all of
our estimations), we view this as supportive of our identification assumptions. The over-identification test
is that φˆIV
B
1 = φˆ
IVW
1 . In Section E of the Online Appendix, we show the conditions under which this would
asymptomatically hold in our setup. Intuitively, the validity of each instrument depends on the correlation
between base-period industrial composition and the error term, ∆uGjct. If the instruments are not valid, each
will weight this correlation differently and each instrument will produce different estimates (Beaudry et al.,
2012, 2018).
31The traditional Bartik is constructed as a local weighted average of national-level employment growth
across industries, Bartikct =
∑
j ηˆjct · gjt. The ηˆic are constructed as in section 3.2 and the national-level
employment growth rates come from the git in equation (26). We interpret this variable as a proxy for city
income and proportional to local expenditure which is part of the local demand shifter. We interact this
variable with industry indicators to allow industry specific effects.
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specifications in columns (3)-(7). In the bottom panel, we again present the Hansen’s-J
over-identification test which easily fails to reject in every specification.
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An estimate of σ of 1.75 suggests that substitutability among varieties in demand is low,
which is not surprising given the relatively high level of industrial aggregation in our data.
Our estimates range from 1.75 to 1.78 and are in line with the median estimates reported in
the literature. For instance, Broda & Weinstein (2006) report a median elasticity of substitu-
tion of 2.2 over the period 1990-2001 for SITC-3 industries. More recently, Soderbery (2015)
estimates a median elasticity of substitution of 1.85 across HS8 products. We interpret our
estimate of σ in Table 2 as a weighted average of industry specific elasticities of substitution.
This is consistent with the fact that, over the period 1996-2010, German manufacturing
production was mainly driven by two industries – chemicals (e.g. with an average export
share of 13.5) and motor vehicles (e.g. with an export share of 19.1) – that the literature has
estimated to have relatively low elasticities of substitution. For instance Ossa (2015) finds
an elasticity of 1.71 for road motor vehicles, 1.8 for parts and accessories for tractors, motor
cars and other motor vehicles, and 1.75 for miscellaneous chemical products.
Combining the estimate of −8 in the gravity equation and σ, we obtain a trade elasticity
of κ = 3.5 under MC-FE-HET and of 7 under the alternative market structures we consider.
Thus, our trade elasticity falls comfortably in the range of estimates documented in the
literature (see Table 3.5 of Head et al. (2014)). In the next section, we use our estimates of
these structural parameters, along with the Welfare equation from section 2.4, to estimate
the relevance of the impact of trade on the employment rate as an additional margin of
adjustment when calculating the welfare gains from trade.
6 Application: The Rise of the East and the Far East
Our relatively low estimate of the elasticity of substitution in consumption suggests that
omitting unemployment and firm heterogeneity might lead to an underestimation of the
welfare gains from trade. We examine this possibility in this section and exploit Germany’s
rapid trade integration with China and Eastern Europe between 1988 and 2008 to study the
welfare consequences of increased market access across cities in West Germany.
In particular, we take the trade elasticity, changes in local employment rates, domestic
trade shares and industry composition as given by the data and ask: how do the welfare
gains from trade with the East over two decades differ relative to those predicted by ACR’s
welfare formula when changes in unemployment are accounted for? From Proposition 1,
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the answer to this question depends on the market structure and on the existence of firm
heterogeneneity. Table 3 shows this.
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The relative gains from trade under MC-FE-HET, given in column 1 of Table 3, depend
on the elasticity of substitution in consumption. We set σˆ = 1.78 from Table 2. To be clear,
this counterfactual exercise is in the spirit of ACR; that is, the relative gains formula e˙
1+ 1
σ−1
c
assumes that two MC-FE-HET models, one featuring search frictions and unemployment (our
model) and the other featuring frictionless labor markets (ACR), are calibrated to deliver
the same trade elasticity and changes in local employment rates, domestic trade shares and
industry composition. Note that the relative gains from trade formula is still valid when the
underlying policy experiment involves changes in the local labor endowments. This follows
from (18), provided that the two models are also calibrated to match the observed changes
in local labor endowmnets. In this case, e˙
1+ 1
σ−1
c should be interpreted as measuring relative
changes in the per-capita equivalent variation.
The same principles apply when comparing the relative gains from trade under alternative
market structures. In column 2 of Table 3, the relative gains from trade under MC-FE-HOM
are a function of the trade elasticity. Following the usual practice in the literature, we recover
it from the gravity equation. Under MC-FE-HOM, the trade elasticity is equal to the wage
elasticity minus one. Based on our estimates from Table 1, we set εˆ = 7. Finally, the last
column of the table shows that, under PC or MC-RE, the relative gains from trade solely
depend on how market access affects the unemployment rate across local labor markets.
In order to implement the formulas in Table 3 empirically, we need to estimate the impact
of increased trade with China and Eastern Europe on the employment rate growth of cities
of West Germany. We follow the methodology developed by Dauth et al. (2014) (and Autor
et al. (2013) for the US) to study the impact of increased trade with the East on the labor
market between 1988-2008.32 Specifically, using data for two time periods (1988-1998 and
1998-2008) we regress:
ec(t+10)
ect
= βIPW · IPWct + βEPW · EPWct +X ′ctα + drt + uct, (28)
32The authors thank Dauth et al. (2014) for sharing the public version of their data which is available for
1988, 1998 and 2008, and 326 cities in Germany. For their analysis at the local level, Dauth et al. (2014)
use the IAB-Establishment History Panel (BHP), a confidential database which contains the universe of all
German establishments. For this reason, the time frame and the level of disaggregation of industries and
cities we use in Section 5 differs from Dauth et al. (2014). In addition the BHP does not provide information
on exports and establishment revenues.
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where ect is computed by dividing total employment by the size of working age population in
city c and time t, X ′ct are city-specific controls (the share of employment in tradable goods
industries, the share of high-skilled, foreign and female workers, as well as the percentage
of routine/intensive occupations), drt is a set of region-time fixed effects, and IPWct and
EPWct are observed decadal changes in import and export exposure, respectively. Both
measures are defined and instrumented as in Dauth et al. (2014), and we refer to the latter
paper for further details.33 We then use the estimates to calculate the predicted impact on
the employment rate:
e˙ct = βˆIPW · IPWct + βˆEPW · EPWct + 1. (29)
Results from this exercise are presented in Table 4. Panel I shows the IV estimates
obtained from estimating equation (28). Columns 1-3 shows results obtained when using
trade with both Eastern Europe and China to compute IPWct and EPWct. Column 4 uses
trade exposure with Eastern Europe only and the last column is based on trade with China.
The first two columns use data for each decade separately.
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Column 3 suggests that, as expected, import exposure has a negative and statistically
significant impact on local employment rate growth while export exposure tends to boost
employment rates. Columns 4 and 5 indicate that these results are driven by trade with
Eastern Europe. Trade with China has a minimal impact on local employment growth and
appears to affect German cities via imports only.
Panel II of Table 4 shows the implied local employment rate growth (from the combined
import and export exposure). Focusing on column 3, we find that increased trade with
33Both measures are directly taken from Dauth et al. (2014). IPWct =
∑
i
Eict
Eit
∆MG←Easti(t+10)
Ect
, where ∆ denotes
a decadal time difference (i.e. 1988-1998 and 1998-2008), EictEit is city c’s share of industrial employment and
Ect is city c manufacturing employment. ∆M
G←East
i(t+10) denotes the change in imports from the East (China
and/or Eastern Europe) between t and t+ 10. Therefore, the measure of local import exposure is a weighted
average of imports from the East to Germany, where the weights are local industrial employment as a share
of aggregate national employment, and captures the extent to which a city was exposed to imports from the
East. The instruments for IPWct is given by IV IPWct =
∑
i
Eic(t−10)
E(it−10)
∆MOthers←Easti(t+10)
Ec(t−10)
, where ∆MOthers←Easti(t+10)
denotes changes in imports from the East to other high income countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway,
New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, and the United Kingdom). EPWct and the corresponding instruments
are constructed in similiar ways but are based on exports. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 50
larger labor markets areas, defined as in Kropp & Schwengler (2011). Finally, note that unlike Dauth et al.
(2014), we follow Autor et al. (2013) and weigh our regression by the share of the population in year 1978.
This means we restrict the data to West Germany, since this information is only available for the West, and
that we work with a balanced panel.
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Eastern Europe and China led to a 3% rise in the growth of the employment rate for the
median local labor market in West Germany. The estimated employment growth rates from
Panel II are used as inputs to compute the relative gains from trade, according to Table 3.
Next, we compute the relative gains from trade according to Table 3, using the estimated
employment rate growth from Panel II as an input for e˙c. Panel III of Table 4 reports the
results. In column 3, we find that for the median local labor market in West Germany our
formula under MC-FE-HET yields welfare gains that are 6% larger than those predicted
by ACR’s formula. In contrast, accounting for changes in the employment rate in frame-
works with homogeneous firms, monopolistic competition with restricted entry or perfect
competition yield relative welfare gains that are 3% larger for the median labor market.
Disaggregated results corresponding to the MC-FE-HET case are mapped in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The figure exhibits substantial variation in the relative welfare gains from trade across
local labor markets; e.g. ranging from 0.7 to 1.52 when looking at trade with both China and
Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the figure suggests that in a framework with heterogeneous
firms, omitting labor market frictions might lead to underestimate the welfare gains from
market access to up to 52%, with the bias being larger for cities close to the border in the
South-West region. The map also suggests that ACR’s welfare formula may overestimate
the gains in a few cities which were, presumably, hit more heavily by import competition.
Finally, in Table 5, we evaluate the impact of trade exposure on population (column 1),
wages (column 2) and employment (column 3).34 The last column corresponds to column
3 of Table 4. Estimates indicate that most of the trade effects on the employment rate are
driven by changes in local employment, while population and wages do not seem to respond
to imports or exports in a statistically significant way. Therefore, this set of results suggest
that greater trade integration with the East and the far East was mostly absorbed by shifts
in labor demand. In addition, these results are also evidence of a rather inelastic labor
supply and support our modeling assumption of no migration or population growth across
local labor markets.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
7 Conclusion
We develop a model and an empirical strategy to estimate the gains from trade in the
presence of frictions in the labor market. Our model delivers a welfare formula showing
34Table D.3 of the Online Appendix shows the results for Eastern Europe and China separately.
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that trade liberalization affects welfare through two channels: (i) the traditional adjustment
margin studied in ACR, which depends on the trade elasticity and on changes in the share
of domestic expenditure; and (ii) a new adjustment margin operating through shifts in the
employment rate. A key takeaway from the theory is that the micro details of the model
matter when evaluating the gains from trade in economies with equilibrium unemployment.
In particular, conditional on the share of domestic expenditure and the trade elasticity, the
welfare implications of trade-induced changes in unemployment depend on the goods market
structure and on the degree of firm heterogeneity.
The paper proposes a novel identification strategy to uncover the two key structural
parameters needed to analyze welfare changes in a broad range of market structures, the
trade elasticity and the elasticity of substitution in consumption. Our identification strategy
follows naturally from our model, based on Bartik-style instruments that exploit exogenous
differences in industrial employment composition across local labor markets. Applying this
methodology to study the rise of trade with the East, we find that omitting trade-induced
changes in the employment rate typically leads to an underestimation of the gains from trade
in West German local labor markets. This bias is particularly important when the underlying
market structure is monopolistic competition with free entry and heterogeneous firms.
34
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Figures
Figure 1: The Rise of the East and the Far East: welfare gains from trade accounting for
unemployment changes relative to ACR, under MC-FE-HET (West Germany).
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Notes: Each figure uses σˆ = 1.78 and the estimates from Table 4 for the period 1988-2008. The first figure is based
on trade with China and Eastern Europe (column 3 of Table 4). The second figure focuses on trade with Eastern
Europe (column 4 of Table 4) and the last one is based on China only (column 5 of Table 4).
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Tables
Table 1: Gravity Estimation
I. OLS/2nd Stage OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coefficient (∆wic) -1.98
∗ -7.98∗∗∗ -7.80∗∗∗ -8.01∗∗∗ -7.82∗∗∗ -7.93∗∗∗ -7.96∗∗∗
city-year (1.03) (2.77) (2.71) (2.69) (2.73) (2.70) (2.68)
2-way (1.03) (3.07) (2.96) (2.95) (2.98) (2.94) (2.97)
Controls:
Industry FE× ∆ City Empl. Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Trends No No No Yes No No No
Lag City Manuf. Share No No No No Yes No No
Manuf.×Trend No No No No No Yes Yes
Demog.×Trend No No No No No No Yes
II. First-stage
IV Bct 2.42
∗ 3.90∗∗ 3.91∗∗ 3.88∗∗ 3.84∗∗ 3.91∗∗
city-year (1.42) (1.59) (1.64) (1.60) (1.60) (1.62)
2-way (1.43) (1.68) (1.74) (1.69) (1.69) (1.71)
IVWct 4.57
∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗ 4.20∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 4.19∗∗∗
city-year (0.48) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44)
2-way (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51)
F -Stat.:
city-year 80.45 97.18 100.28 97.82 98.56 100.02
2-way 58.92 64.26 65.08 64.46 64.81 65.12
Over-id. p value:
city-year 0.56 0.91 0.82 0.90 0.85 0.89
2-way 0.58 0.92 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.91
Observations 3940 3713 3713 3713 3713 3713 3713
Notes. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the city-year (first line) and two-way clustered at the city-year and
industry-city (second line) level. (∗∗∗), (∗∗), and (∗) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, and refer to
city-year clustering. All models are estimated using 24 city by 29 manufacturing industry cells in first differences from 1996-2010.
The dependent variable is the change in ln XicFt
Rict
, the city-industry ratio of exports to revenues. ∆ lnwict is the regression adjusted
city-industry wage. Column 1 is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares and columns 2-6 are estimated via Two Stage Least Squares.
All regressions are weighted by the t−1 number of establishments in the city-industry cell. The control Manuf.×Trend is the average
1992/93 city share of manufacturing employment, interacted with linear trends. The control set Demog.×Trend includes the average
1992/93 city share of college graduates, female workers, native Germans, log employment rate, and log size of the labour force –
all interacted with linear trends. Panel II shows the the first-stage estimates and the associated tests of instrument relevance. The
second last row shows the p-value for the Hansen J overidentification test, and the last row shows the number of city-industry cells
used in the estimations.
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Table 2: Revenue Estimation
I. OLS/2nd Stage OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coefficient (∆wic) -0.54
∗ -0.75∗ -0.76∗ -0.78∗ -0.77∗ -0.76∗ -0.75∗
city-year (0.28) (0.45) (0.45) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43)
2-way (0.28) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56)
σ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗
city-year (0.28) (0.45) (0.45) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43)
2-way (0.28) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56)
Controls:
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE× ∆ City Empl. Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE×Bartik Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Trends No No No Yes No No No
Lag Manuf. Share No No No No Yes No No
Manuf.×Trend No No No No No Yes Yes
Demog.×Trend No No No No No No Yes
II. First-stage
IV Bct 3.74
∗∗ 3.74∗∗ 3.83∗∗ 3.82∗∗ 3.74∗∗ 3.80∗∗
city-year (1.58) (1.58) (1.64) (1.59) (1.62) (1.63)
2-way (1.99) (1.99) (2.04) (2.00) (2.02) (2.02)
IVWct 3.87
∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗
city-year (0.58) (0.58) (0.60) (0.59) (0.60) (0.60)
2-way (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74) (0.74)
F-Stats:
city-year 36.98 36.97 36.82 37.24 36.66 36.97
2-way 27.68 27.68 27.67 28.05 27.56 27.73
Hansen p-vals:
city-year 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.15
2-way 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22
Observations 46503 46503 46503 46503 46503 46503 46503
Notes. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the city-year (first line) and two-way clustered at the city-year
and industry-city (second line) level. (∗∗∗), (∗∗), and (∗) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, and
refer to city-year clustering. All models are estimated using 24 city by 29 manufacturing industry cells in first differences from
1996-2010. The dependent variable is the change in ln r(ϕ)ic, firm-level city-industry domestic revenues. ∆ lnwict is the regression
adjusted city-industry wage. Column 1 is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares and columns 2-6 are estimated via Two Stage Least
Squares. All regressions are weighted by establishment survey weights. The control Manuf.×Trend is the average 1992/93 city share
of manufacturing employment, interacted with linear trends. The control set Demog.×Trend includes the average 1992/93 city
share of college graduates, female workers, native Germans, log employment rate, and log size of the labour force – all interacted
with linear trends. Panel II shows the the first-stage estimates and the associated tests of instrument relevance. The second last
row shows the p-value for the Hansen J overidentification test, and the last row shows the number of city-industry cells used in the
estimations.
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Table 3: Gains from trade in frictional settings relative to those predicted by ACR’s welfare
formula
MC-FE-HET MC-FE-HOM PC or MC-RE
(Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)) (Krugman (1980)) (Armington (1969))
e˙
1+ 1
σ−1
c e˙
1+ 1
ε
c e˙c
σˆ = 1.78 εˆ = 7
42
Table 4: Trade Exposure, Employment Rate Growth and the Relative Gains from Trade
I. 2nd Stage Eastern Europe + China Eastern Europe China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1988-98 1998-08 1988-2008 1988-2008 1988-2008
∆ Import Exposure -0.0099 -0.0085∗∗ -0.0096∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.0086∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.011) (0.0041)
∆ Export Exposure 0.017∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.013
(0.0078) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0085) (0.014)
Observations 326 326 652 652 652
R2 0.328 0.109 0.420 0.353 0.417
II. Employment rate growth
Predicted e˙c
Mean 101.58 102.91 102.78 103.53 99.60
Med 101.38 102.55 102.54 103.03 99.90
10th pct. 100.31 101.05 100.61 100.56 98.27
90th pct. 103.02 105.09 105.14 107.12 100.76
III. Relative Welfare Gains
MC-FE-HET: (e˙c)
1+ 1σ−1
Mean 103.64 106.76 106.46 108.25 99.10
Med 103.19 105.92 105.88 107.05 99.77
10th pct. 100.71 102.41 101.40 101.29 96.09
90th pct. 107.02 112.01 112.12 117.00 101.73
MC-FE-HOM: (e˙c)
1+ 1
Mean 101.81 103.33 103.18 104.05 99.55
Med 101.58 102.92 102.90 103.47 99.89
10th pct. 100.35 101.20 100.70 100.64 98.02
90th pct. 103.46 105.84 105.90 108.18 100.87
Notes. Panel I presents the regression results of equation (28), estimated over 326 cities of West Germany.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the level of 50 larger labor markets areas. (∗∗∗), (∗∗), and (∗) denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the employment rate growth in city
c. ect is computed by dividing total employment by the size of working age population in city c and time t. ∆ Import
Exposure (IPWct) and ∆ Export Exposure (EPWct) are observed decadal changes in import and export exposure,
respectively. Specifically, IPWct =
∑
i
Eict
Eit
∆MG←Easti(t+10)
Ect
, where ∆ denotes a decadal time difference, Eict
Eit
is city c’s
share of industrial employment and Ect is city c manufacturing employment. ∆MG←Easti(t+10) denotes the change in
imports from the East between t and t+10. ∆ Export Exposure (EPWct) is computed similarly using exports. Each
specification includes a set of region-time fixed effects and city-specific controls (the share of employment in tradable
goods industries, the share of high-skilled, foreign and female workers, as well as the percentage of routine/intensive
occupations). In each column, we instrument import exposure using IV IPWct =
∑
i
Eic(t−10)
E(it−10)
∆MOthers←Easti(t+10)
Ec(t−10)
,
where ∆MOthers←East
i(t+10)
denotes changes in imports from the East to other high income countries. We instrument
export exposure in a similar way using exports. In columns 1-3, IPWct and EPWct are computed using imports
from and exports to both China and Easter Europe. Column 4 focuses on trade with Eastern Europe and column
5 only uses trade with China. Columns 1, 2 and 3-5 use decadal difference over the period 1988-1998, 1998-2008
and 1988-2008, respectively. We weigh our regressions by the share of the population in year 1978. In Panel II,
the Relative Gains from Trade under PC or MC-RE equal e˙, the predicted employment growth, calculated using
equation (29). Panel III presents the estimated relative gains from trade. Both employment rate growth in panel II
and relative welfare gains in panel III are expressed in percentage.
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Table 5: Trade Exposure and Other Outcomes
Population Wages Employment Emp. Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Import Exposure -0.0028 -0.000060 -0.012∗∗ -0.0096∗∗
(0.0021) (0.00026) (0.0052) (0.0039)
∆ Export Exposure -0.00078 0.00050 0.0100∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.0012) (0.00033) (0.0045) (0.0043)
Constant 0.18∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.047) (0.0049) (0.079) (0.053)
Observations 652 652 652 652
R2 0.446 0.952 0.237 0.420
Notes. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the level of 50 larger labor
markets areas. (∗∗∗), (∗∗), and (∗) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, re-
spectively. The Table presents regression results of (28), estimated on different city outcome
variables over 326 cities of West Germany. The dependent variables are population growth
(column 1), the growth of wages (column 2), employment growth (column 3) and the em-
ployment rate growth (column 4) at the city level. The specification in column 4 corresponds
to the specification in column 3 of Table 4. ∆ Import Exposure (IPWct) and ∆ Export
Exposure (EPWct) are observed decadal changes (1988-1998 and 1998-2008) in import and
export exposure, respectively. IPWct and EPWct are computed using imports from and ex-
ports to both China and Easter Europe. Specifically, IPWct =
∑
i
Eict
Eit
∆MG←Easti(t+10)
Ect
, where
∆ denotes a decadal time difference, Eict
Eit
is city c’s share of industrial employment and
Ect is city c manufacturing employment. ∆MG←Easti(t+10) denotes the change in imports from
the East between t and t + 10. ∆ Export Exposure (EPWct) is computed similarly using
exports. Each specification includes a set of region-time fixed effects and city-specific con-
trols (the share of employment in tradable goods industries, the share of high-skilled, foreign
and female workers, as well as the percentage of routine/intensive occupations). In each
column, we instrument import exposure using IV IPWct =
∑
i
Eic(t−10)
E(it−10)
∆MOthers←Easti(t+10)
Ec(t−10)
,
where ∆MOthers←East
i(t+10)
denotes changes in imports from the East to other high income
countries. We instrument export exposure in a similar way using exports. We weigh our
regressions by the share of the population in year 1978.
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